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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
During the past three years, Florida tort law has undergone
significant changes. The adoption of no fault insurance' and a new
wrongful death act,2 as well as modifications in the liability of man-
ufacturers,3 sellers,4 landowners5 and independent contractors,6 have
all changed the complexion of tort actions to varying degrees. With-
out a doubt, however, the most significant development has been
the adoption of comparative negligence.'
I. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
A. Introduction
In the historic case of Hoffman v. Jones,' the Supreme Court
of Florida ushered in a new era for the majority of practitioners in
the state by adopting comparative negligence9 as the rule of law in
all tort cases.'0
The concept of comparative negligence is not new in the United
States; it has long been deeply rooted in various aspects of the law.
Statutes such as the Federal Employer's Liability Act," the Jones
1. See text section III,C infra.
2. See text section IX infra.
3. See text section II,B infra.
4. Id.
5. See text section II,C infra.
6. These changes, among others, are treated in the text below.
7. See text section I infra.
8. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
9. The court provided that the comparative negligence rule is applicable to all cases
reaching trial after July 10, 1973, even if the action itself was commenced before that time,
and to all cases on appeal at the time of its decision in which the question of comparative
negligence had been properly and appropriately raised, even if the trial or lower court ren-
dered its judgment prior to Hoffman. Id. at 440.
To study the application of this mandate by the district courts of appeal, see Williams
v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 283 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1973) (comparative negligence applicable where
that standard has been applied by the trial court prior to Hoffman; Thorton v. Elliot, 288
So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1973) (issue of comparative negligence held to have been raised in the trial
court); Hartley v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 299 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974) (comparative
negligence not applicable when not raised at the trial court level); Grant v. Red Lobster Inns
of America, Inc., 292 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 298 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1974),
(plaintiff's request for a jury instruction on comparative negligence held sufficient to have
raised the issue at the trial level); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Reed, 299 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1974) (objections to a jury instruction on comparative negligence held sufficient to have raised
the issue at the trial court level).
10. For a more in depth treatment of this topic, see Timmons & Silvis, Pure Comparative
Negligence in Florida: A New Adventure in the Common Law, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Timmons & Silvis].
11. 45 U.S.C. § 51-60 (1970).
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Act 2 and the old Florida Railroad Statute, 3 have provided for some
form of comparative negligence in specific areas. In addition, a ma-
jority of states have presently adopted some form of the doctrine as
a general rule in all tort cases.'4
Under Hoffman, Florida has joined the small minority of states
which follow the so-called "pure form" of comparative negligence,"
under which damages are apportioned purely according to fault, so
that the plaintiff may recover even if he is "more negligent" than
the defendant. Likewise, the defendant will not be barred from re-
covery against the plaintiff on a counterclaim, so that under a set-
off, the plaintiff may end up owing the defendant money." Thus,
under the pure form of comparative negligence, the plaintiff and the
single defendant, as a counterclaimant, are both in the same posi-
tion in the sense that neither will be barred from recovery for the
other's negligence, regardless of how great is his own.
This situation is in contrast to the "modified form" of compara-
tive negligence followed by the great majority of jurisdictions, in
which a party may recover only when his negligence is "not as great"
as that of the other party or in other words, when he is less than 50
percent negligent."
While comparative negligence will have no effect on the form
of the counterclaim, it will clearly proliferate its use. Recognizing
this and the fact that every party will be entitled to a verdict under
comparative negligence, the Hoffman opinion provided that
[i]n such event the Court should enter one judgment in favor of
the party receiving the larger verdict, the amount of which should
be the difference between the two verdicts. . . .in keeping with
the long recognized principles of "set off" in contract litigation.
12. 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1970).
13. Fi.A. STAT. § 768.06 (1973).
14. Timmons & Silvis, supra note 10, at 739.
15. Id.
16. If, for example, the plaintiff suffered damages of $10,000 and was only 10 percent
negligent, while the defendant, who was 90 percent negligent, suffered $100,000 in damages,
the plaintiff would receive a verdict for $9,000 ($10,000 less 10 percent of $10,000) but would
end up having a judgment of $1,000 entered against him, because the defendant would be
entitled to a $10,000 setoff ($100,000 less 90 percent of $100,000).
17. While this protects the plaintiff from counterclaims by a defendant whose negligence
is greater, it suffers the inequity of barring a plaintiff who is 50 percent negligent from any
recovery whatsoever, while allowing the plaintiff who is 49 percent negligent recovery of 51
percent of his damages.
18. 280 So. 2d at 439.
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Comparative negligence in Florida, however, is still in an evolv-
ing state. Although Hoffman laid a broad framework, several im-
portant questions relating to its application were left open by the
supreme court, which chose not to answer these questions until they
are actually raised and adequately presented." The court also noted
that an extensive body of case law already exists in Florida dealing
with the application of comparative negligence under the old Rail-
road Statute "' "much of . . . [which] will be applicable under the
[new] comparative negligence rule. .... "21 In addition, it was also
pointed out that
[t]he answers to many of the problems will be obvious in light
of the purposes for which we adopt the rule stated above: . . .
[t]o allow a jury to apportion fault as it sees fit between negli-
gent parties . . . [and] [to apportion the total damages result-
ing from the loss or injury according to the proportionate fault of
each party."2
B. Effects on Defenses
Perhaps the most significant of these unanswered questions
related to the effect that the adoption of comparative negligence
would have on the defense of assumption of risk. Although Hoffman
made it clear that contributory negligence would no longer act as a
total bar to a plaintiff's recovery," but instead merely reduce his
damages in proportion to his fault,2 the court expressly declined to
decide whether the defense of assumption of risk would be similarly
19. Id.
20. FLA. STAT. § 768.06 (1973). This statute provided that
Injo person shall recover damages from a railroad company for injury to himself
or to his property, where the same is done by his consent, or is caused by his own
negligence. If the plaintiff and the agents of the company are both at fault, the
former may recover, but the amount of recovery shall be such a proportion of the
entire damages sustained, as the defendant's negligence bears to the combined
negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant.
Although this statute was declared unconstitutional in 1965 on equal protection and due
process grounds in Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-up Bottling Co., 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965),
it was the source of a voluminous body of case law on comparative negligence.
21. 280 So. 2d at 439.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 438.
24. From the time of Louisville & N.R.R. v. Tniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886), until Hoffman,
contributory negligence was a total bar to recovery. Under Hoffman, the availability of the
defense was not changed, but merely its effect. The defendant will still raise the issue of the
plaintiff's negligence as a defense.
[Vol. 30:357
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affected.2" Since Hoffman, however, the Third and Fourth District
Courts of Appeal have been presented with this question and have
reached directly conflicting conclusions.
In Dorta v. Blackburn," the Third District concluded that, de-
spite the adoption of comparative negligence in Hoffman, the
supreme court still appeared to recognize assumption of risk, and
thus held the defense to be a complete bar to recovery.27 The articu-
lation of its reasoning by the court was very limited, consisting in
substance of a notation that other jurisdictions with comparative
negligence still recognized assumption of risk as a valid defense. In
addition, a reference was made to Issen v. Licenberg,28 a previous
Third District decision in which the court had held that the doctrine
of no contribution among joint tortfeasors had survived Hoffman.
Issen, however, has since been reversed by the Supreme. Court of
Florida on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the principles
of Hoffman.29
An opposite and sounder conclusion was reached by the Fourth
District in Rea v. Leadership Housing, Inc.'" In Rea, the court held
that the distinction between assumption of risk and contributory
negligence was a distinction without a difference3' so that assump-
tion of risk as a defense was merged with the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence and was, thus, similarily not a total bar to recovery."2
Despite the supreme court's general reference to the old Rail-
road Statute, this source presents no insight into the ultimate reso-
lution of the conflict, because it has no body of case law dealing
specifically with the question of assumption of risk. The explanation
for this lack of cases lies in the language of the statute, which bars
recovery of damages by a person for injury "where the same is done
by his consent .... ."I Since assumption of risk involves consent to
a risk which is different from the statutory language of consent to
an injury, assumption of risk cases did not arise. In addition, the
25. 280 So. 2d at 439.
26. 302 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
27. Id. at 451.
28. 293 So. 2d at 778.
29. 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975), rev'g 293 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
30. 312 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
31. Id. at 821.
32. Id. at 823.
33. Fla. Laws 1887, ch. 3744, §§ 1-2 [18871 (declared unconstitutional in 1965). See note
20 .supro.
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case law on consent to injury under the Railroad Statute is sparse
and provides no insights into the status of assumption of risk under
the comparative negligence doctrine.
Reference to Florida common law treatment of the two defenses
and the experiences of other comparative negligence jurisdictions
clearly supports the position taken by the Fourth District in giving
the defense a comparative effect. The Florida case law prior to
Hoffman has had little occasion to probe deeply into the nature of
assumption of risk and has consequently characterized it simply as
an extension of contributory negligence differing only in degree."
Thus, the giving of a comparative effect to contributory negligence
under Hoffman should mandate the same treatment for assumption
of risk as well.
This conclusion is strengthened by the decisions of other com-
parative negligence jurisdictions. States which have given the de-
fense a comparative effect, including California, Minnesota, Wash-
ington and Wisconsin, have based their decision chiefly on the pur-
poses underlying their comparative negligence doctrines."5 In this
connection, the purposes under which the comparative negligence
rule for Florida was adopted were:
(1) [t]o allow a jury to apportion fault as it sees fit between
negligent parties whose negligence was part of the legal and prox-
imate cause of any loss of injury; and
(2) [t]o apportion the total damages resulting from the loss or
injury according to the proportionate fault of each party.
As pointed out in Rea,37 these purposes, especially the second, would
be best served by the merger of assumption of risk with comparative
negligence.
States which have retained assumption of risk as a complete
defense include Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, Nebraska and
South Dakota." Their decisions have been based generally on an
analysis of the difference between assumption of risk and contribu-
tory negligence, equating the former with consent to incur a risk and
the latter with fault. 9 By emphasizing that the purpose of compara-
34. Timmons & Silvis, supra note 10 at 772-75.
35. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, 167-72, (1974), 3-4 (Supp. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as SCHWARTZ1.
36. 280 So. 2d at 439.
37. 312 So. 2d at 823.
38. SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 161-62.
39. Id. at 161-65.
[Vol. 30:357
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tive negligence is to apportion fault, these states have left assump-
tion of risk, based on consent to incur a risk, outside the realm of
comparative negligence.'
Therefore, because Florida courts have never maintained a
rigid distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence, preferring instead to recognize assumption of risk as merely
an extension of contributory negligence,4 a radical change in analy-
sis would have been necessary to apply the rationale of these states
recognizing assumption of risk as a complete defense.
Neither is it certain as to what effect the adoption of compara-
tive negligence will have on other defenses. Although Hoffman ex-
pressly abolished the doctrine of last clear chance,4" it remained
silent in regards to other judicially created doctrines which had been
developed in response to the harshness of contributory negligence's
total bar to a plaintiffs recovery. The adoption of comparative neg-
ligence would properly remove the need for these artificial doctrines,
which then would become merely "factors" to be weighed by the
jury in apportioning fault.
It is apparent from Hoffman, however, that comparative negli-
gence will have no effect upon the defenses of "no negligence" and
"lack of proximate cause," because the court's opinion made it clear
that there can be no apportionment of fault where there is no fault
on one side. 3
C. Joint Tortfeasors
Although declining to decide the fate of Florida's common law
"no contribtuion rule" under comparative negligence in Hoffman v.
Jones,44 the Supreme Court of Florida subsequently adopted the
doctrine of contribution among joint tortfeasors in Issen v.
Licenberg,45 following the legislature's statutory recognition46 of the
same principle during the pendency of the Issen appeal.
40. Id.
41. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
42. 280 So. 2d at 438. Nevertheless, this is not to say that a defendant's last clear chance
to avoid injuring a plaintiff will not be taken into account as one factor in deciding the
ultimate question of negligence, even if the doctrine is not used by name.
43. Id.
44. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
45. 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975), rev'g 293 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
46. FILA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975). The Act became effective June 13, 1975 and applies to
all causes of action pending at the time of its passage in which the right of contribution among
joint tortfeasors is involved and to cases thereafter filed.
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In Issen, the plaintiff, having been involved in a collision, sued
both the driver of the vehicle in which she was a passenger and the
other driver. The jury, through the use of special interrogatories,
determined that plaintiffs driver was 15 percent at fault and that
the other driver was 85 percent at fault in causing the collision. The
trial judge certified the question of whether it was proper to appor-
tion the fault between the tortfeasors to the Third District Court of
Appeal. The appellate court answered the question in the negative,
noting that Hoffman had not affected the common law rule of no
contribution among joint tortfeasors in Florida. 7
The supreme court, after granting conflict certiorari on the
ground that there was a conflict between Issen and its own decision
in Hoffman,4" adopted the contribution rule by reasoning that:
[tihere is no equitable justification for recognizing the right of
the plaintiff to seek recovery on the basis of apportionment of
fault while denying the right of fault allocation as between negli-
gent defendants."
Nevertheless, although the court apparently would have relied
upon its Hoffman.rationale to adopt the rule of contribution among
joint tortfeasors, when implementing the rule the court deemed it-
self bound to ignore this framework of analysis. The Hoffman ra-
tionale would have required the formulation of tortfeasors' shares by
their percentage of fault, but instead, the court followed the pro rata
formula required by the newly passed Uniform Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasor's Act,5 which is inconsistent with the court's ra-
tionale in Hoffman.
The Act retains the joint and several liability of joint tortfeasors
in regards to the plaintiff but requires contribution on a pro rata
basis to the extent that the tortfeasor has paid in excess of his pro
rata share.' Moreover, in determining the pro rata share, the Act
specifies that the relative degree of fault shall not be considered.52
Thus, the only determination that now needs to be made is the
47. 293 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). Accord, Rader v. Variety Children's Hosp., 293
So. 2d 778 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
48. It is difficult to find a conflict between the two cases since Hoffman left open the
question while Issen offered an answer. It is apparent that the court was now ready to answer
its own question and saw such an opportunity.
49. 318 So. 2d at 391.
50. FiA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(b) (1975).
51. Id.
52. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(c) (1975).
[Vol. 30:357
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degree of fault between the plaintiff on one hand and the joint
tortfeasors jointly on the other, with the joint tortfeasors sharing
damages on a pro rata basis despite their relative degree of fault in
relation to one another.
D. Conclusion
Although many questions left unanswered by Hoffman have
been answered during the survey period, it will take many years for
a body of case law to develop in order to fill in all the gaps. Never-
theless, regardless of the present uncertainty in many areas and the
hidden dangers posed to the unwary, the adoption of comparative
negligence has had the welcome effect of providing "a more equita-
ble system of determining liability and a more socially desirable




Although expert testimony is ordinarily essential to support an
action for malpractice, Florida juries have in the past been permit-
ted to determine liability without such testimony in certain cases.
This has occurred in those cases based upon negligence in adminis-
tering an approved medical treatment as distinguished from actions
based upon an incorrect diagnosis or the adoption of the wrong
method of treatment. 4 This rule was reaffirmed during the survey
period by the Second District Court of Appeals in Pierce v. Smith."
Pierce, a doctor aware of Smith's prior history of bleeding, per-
formed a bilateral vasectomy and allowed him to leave the office
while he was still bleeding. When Smith returned two days later in
a swollen condition and still bleeding, the doctor only recommended
application of ice packs and prescribed an antibiotic. The court held
that expert testimony for the plaintiff was not necessary and that
the jury had the right to conclude that under the circumstances the
doctor had failed to take appropriate precautions to control the
bleeding.
53. 280 So. 2d at 437.
54. Atkins v. Humes, 110 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1959); Furnari v. Lurie, 242 So. 2d 742 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1971).
55. 301 So. 2d 805 (Fla, 2d Dist. 1974).
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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals further bolstered the jury's
role by holding that a medical expert may not invade the jury's
province of determining the ultimate issue of proximate cause by
testifying that the injurious result was in fact occasioned by a par-
ticular cause." Thus, the court limited an expert to testifying that
the alleged malpractice could have occasioned the result. 7
2. MALPRACTICE ACT
In an effort to meet the outcry over rising medical malpractice
insurance rates, the Florida legislature passed the Medical Mal-
practice Reform Act of 1975.1s The Act took effect July 1, 197511 and
promises to produce both drastic changes and widespread contro-
versy in the tort law surrounding the doctor-patient relationship.
The Malpractice Act inserts a mediation panel, consisting of
one lawyer, one doctor, and one circuit judge, "' between the plaintiff
and the circuit court by requiring that all malpractice claims be
submitted to such a panel for a determination of the issue of liabil-
ity. " If there is a finding of liability, the parties may agree to use
the panel for assistance in assessing damages.2
Either party may also reject the decision of the mediation panel
and force the claim into the circuit court.63 If this occurs, however,
the Malpractice Act provides that the findings of the mediation
panel will be admissible in evidence" and that the doctor's insurer
may not be joined as a co-defendant nor even be mentioned during
56. Hernandez v. Clinica Pasteur, Inc., 293 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
57. 293 So. 2d at 749. The hospital was found liable for the acts of its unlicensed resident
and supervising physician who failed to administer an electrocardiogram when told that
decedent was suffering chest and stomach pain and instead advised him to go home and do
exercises. Decedent followed their instructions, suffered severe pains, and returned to the
hospital where an electrocardiograph was taken, showing myocardial infarction. There was
expert testimony at trial that the exercise decedent was directed to take would increase the
damage to a patient suffering from a myocardial infraction.
58. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9.
59. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 17.
60. FLA. STAT. § 768.133(1) (1975), created by Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 5(1).
61. FLA. SrAT. § 768.133(2) (1975). The Malpractice Act provides for full discovery proce-
dures in preparation for the mediation panel hearing. FLA. STAT. § 768.133(5) (1975). The
hearing itself is a full evidentiary proceeding, complete with presentation of witnesses and
opening and closing statements, but without strict adherence to the rules of procedure and
evidence.
62. FIA. STAT. § 768.133(9) (1975).
63. FLA. STAT. § 768.133(10) (1975).
64. FLA. STAT. § 768.133(11) (1975).
(Vol. 30:357
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the trial. "' This latter consequence is certain to raise a constitutional
attack on the Malpractice Act in light of the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Shingleton v. Bussey"6 that joinder is a procedural issue and
under the Florida Constitution," the determination of procedural
issues is solely within the province of the courts.
Further changes are made in the insurance structure of medical
malpractice actions. The Act establishes a joint underwriting fund
composed of all the casualty insurers in the state. Any claim in
excess of $100,000 must be made jointly against the individual de-
fendant and the insurance fund, with the fund absorbing any ver-
dict in excess of $100,000.6
The Act also changes the statute of limitations in medical mal-
practice actions from two years after the cause of action is (or should
have been) discovered, to an absolute maximum of four years, re-
gardless of time of discovery. 9 In addition it codifies the law of
informed consent' and makes provisions for the discipline of physi-
cians by the State Board of Medical Examiners.7
Several aspects of the Malpractice Act, in addition to the pre-
viously discussed joinder provisions, also promise to produce consid-
erable controversy. The Act does not require the defendant-doctor
to submit to the panel, but rather requires the plaintiff-patient to
go through the mediation panel as a condition precedent to institut-
ing an action at law. The provision changing the statute of limita-
tions will also result in further debate due to the unavoidable delay
in discovery of some malpractice claims, as will the entire concept
of restructuring court proceedings in light of the Florida constitu-
tional guarantee" to every citizen of access to the courts for redress
of any injury, requiring justice to be administered without sale,
denial, or delay.
B. Manufacturers and Suppliers
During the survey period, contrasting decisions had the effect
65. Fi.A. STAT. § 768.133(10) (1975).
66. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
67. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
68. FLA. STAT. § 627.353 (1975), created by Fla.Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 15.
69. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4) (1975), amended by Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 7.
70. FI.A. STAT. § 768.132 (1975), created by Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 11.
71. FLA. STAT. § 458.120(5) (1975), created by Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 12 and FLA.
STAT. § 458.120(6) (1975), amended by Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 12.
72. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
of both increasing and decreasing manufacturers' and suppliers'
exposure to products liability suits.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, an old aid to plaintiffs in
personal injury actions bottomed on warranty theories, was limited
in a recent exploding bottle case based upon negligence and breach
of implied warranty for injuries sustained." Plaintiff removed a 28-
ounce bottle of Coca-Cola from her refrigerator and it exploded,
injuring her foot. The evidence showed that plaintiff did not
"bump" the bottle at the time it was removed from the refrigerator,
nor did the bottle encounter any sudden temperature changes.
Although the court reviewed previous Florida exploding bottle
cases in which bottlers had been found liable under the application
of res ipsa even though the bottle causing the injury was not in its
possession or control at the time of the accident,74 it nevertheless
held that the plaintiff's case had failed to meet the tests for imposi-
tion of liability either on the theory of negligence or that of implied
warranty, because there was no evidence of what had happened to
the bottle while in the retailer's possession.5 The majority opinion
prompted a strong dissent which termed the proof requirement un-
realistic since it placed a "well nigh impossible burden on the plain-
tiff." The dissent also called attention to the trend of modern
decisions removing some of these strict requirements as proof.
A contrasting relaxation of proof requirements was shown in
McCarthy v. Florida Ladder Co.7" Here the plaintiff sued under the
theory of implied warranty, for injuries allegedly caused by a defec-
tive ladder.7" The ladder disappeared by the time of trial and the
73. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 299 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1st Dist.), petition for cert.
dismissed, 301 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1974).
74. E.g., Groves v. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 40 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1949). Compare
Hughes v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 155 Fla. 299, 19 So. 2d 862 (1944), where direct
proof of negligence was held to be necessary if plaintiff shows no unusual atmospheric or
temperature change or improper handling after the bottle has left possession oi bottler.
75. [Tihere must be proof, in order for an injured purchaser to recover from
the bottler in cases where the product was purchased from an intermediate re-
tailer, that the product "was not handled improperly from the time it left the
possession of the bottler up to the time of the explosion."
299 So. 2d at 82.
76. 299 So. 2d at 84. The dissent's reliance upon Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Shaw, 118
So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960), in which an implied warranty theory was applied to a bottle
as well as its contents seems misplaced, however, for in Shaw there was evidence of damage
to the bottle which was present when it was filled and capped, whereas in the instant case
the bottle was not admitted into evidence and no such defect was shown.
77. 295 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
78. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318, FLA. STAT. § 672.2-318 (1973), expands warranty
[Vol. 30:357
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judge granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. In revers-
ing the summary judgment, the Second District said, "[t]here is
no rule of law which holds that proof of a defective product cannot
be established by parol testimony.""5 The court, in effect, held that
it is not necessary to prove a specific defect, but rather that a defect
may be inferred from the fact that a new product performs in such
a manner as to preclude any other reasonable inference which would
suggest that the product was not defective. Such an interpretation
may very well open the door for a deluge of cases where examination
of the "missing item" might readily show no defect.
Manufacturers were further exposed to liability by the adoption
of the doctrine of "crashworthiness," when the Third District Court
of Appeal held that an automobile manufacturer's liability ex-
tended to a defect which caused injury to a user as a result of a
collision, even though the defect was not a cause of the collision.",
The plaintiff's decedent, a passenger in the rear seat, was thrown
against the front seat which had slid forward after the collision,
exposing the sharp edges of the rail on which the seat was mounted.
When the passenger fell to the floor, her head hit the rail and she
suffered injuries which ultimately caused her death. The court
stated that the issue of proximate cause was to be resolved by the
jury"' and accordingly reversed the order dismissing the plaintiff's
complaint.
The liability of sellers for the negligent construction and design
of their products was extended in Keller v. Eagle Army-Navy De-
partment Stores, Inc. 2 so as to be commensurate with that of manu-
facturers of products which, although not dangerous instrumental-
ities per se, are rendered inherently dangerous by their defects. The
court's holding was based squarely on Restatement (Second) of
liability by providing that
lal seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to ... an employee,
servant or agent of his buyer if it is reasonable to expect that such person may
use, . . . the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.
Thus, plaintiff, who was an employee of the ladder's purchaser, had a cause of action for
breach of implied warranty under Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314, FLA. STAT. § 672.2-314
(1973).
79. 295 So. 2d at 709.
80. Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). For an in depth analysis of the
doctrine of crashworthiness, see Rossman & Bramnick, The Crashworthiness Doctrine-A
Search For a Rational Answer in Florida, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 70 (1974).
81. 297 So. 2d at 44.
82. 291 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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Torts § 402A1: which subjects a seller to liability for physical harm
caused to an ultimate user.
The case arose when a combination torch and mosquito repel-
lant device exploded, severely burning a minor guest of the pur-
chaser. The torch had been lit and handled properly, and the explo-
sion occurred when it was raised and inclined after being in opera-
tion for half an hour. There was expert testimony that the can was
improperly constructed and that improper design and negligent
construction of the torch resulted in a gaseous state which caused
the explosion.
Although Florida law had previously held a manufacturer
strictly liable for the negligent construction or design of a product
made inherently dangerous by such a negligent defect even though
the article was not a dangerous instrumentality per se, Keller is the
first Florida decision to hold a mere seller strictly liable for such
defects. While the injury here was sustained by a user, rather than
by the purchaser, the court nevertheless recognized the public pol-
icy of protecting the consuming public in stating that it
[sleems entirely reasonable to allow recovery against the seller
of such an article under the same circumstances and condi-
tions . ..
Since the seller, by marketing the potentially dangerous
product for use and consumption and by inducement and promo-
tion encourages the use of these products he sells, he undertakes
a certain and special responsibility towards the consuming public
who may be injured by it."
Liability for breach of warranty does not extend to suppliers
and sellers of blood under Florida Statutes section 672.316(5),"5 un-
8:3. ESIATEMENT (SECOND) OF r'Ors § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
t herehy caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller
is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or
consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual rela-
tion with the seller.
84. 291 So. 2d at 61.
85. I".A. S'rr. § 672.2-316(5) (1973) provides that
the procurement, processing, storage, distribution, or use of whole blood, plasma,
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less it is possible to detect or remove the defect causing the impur-
ity, thus making the real basis for such a cause of action a negligent
rendition of services." Noting that there can be a breach of warranty
only where a sale is involved, the First District Court of Appeal
concluded that the legislature had created a hybrid form of war-
ranty in making a concept ordinarily cognizable only in the law of
sales applicable to the law of negligence. 7 Thus, the adoption of
Florida Statutes section 672.316-(5), as apparently properly con-
strued by the First District, reverses the trend of recent cases8
considering the supply of blood a sale to which warranty theory
would apply.
C. Owners and Occupiers of Land
1. CLASSIFICATION OF VISITORS
Prior to the landmark decision of Post v. Lunney,9 it was often
difficult for a plaintiff to recover for injuries which he suffered on
the premises of another, because the standard of care required of the
landowner varied depending upon whether one was held to be a
trespasser, licensee or invitee. In order to receive the higher stan-
dard of care'" accorded to an invitee, it was necessary for the plain-
blood products, and blood derivatives for the purpose of injecting or transfusing
the same, or any of them, into the human body for any purpose whatsoever is
declared to be the rendering of a service by any person participating therein and
does not constitute a sale, whether or not any consideration is given therefore, and
the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose
shall not be applicable as to a defect that cannot be detected or removed by
reasonable use of scientific procedures or techniques.
86. Williamson v. Memorial Hosp., 307 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
87. Id. at 201.
88. See Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Benitez, 257 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). Earlier Florida
cases had distinguished between the liability of commercial blood banks and hospitals, hold-
ing only the former liable under warranty theory. Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc.,
185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966), modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967); Hoder v. Sayet, 196
So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). In Benitez, the court found a hospital liable under warranty
theory by analogizing it to a commercial blood bank, holding that the transaction was a sale
and not a service.
89. 261 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972), discharging cert. from 248 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
90. The higher standard of care due an invitee was stated in McNulty v. Hyrley, 97 So.
2d 185, 187, (Fla. 1957) as follows:
The owner or occupant owes an invitee the duty of keeping the premises in a
reasonably safe condition, and . . . to guard against subjecting such person to
damages of which the owner or occupant is cognizant or might reasonably have
foreseen.
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tiff to be on the landowner's premises for the "mutual economic
benefit" of the parties."
In Lunney, the Supreme Court of Florida replaced this "eco-
nomic" or "mutual benefit" requirement with the "invitation test"
set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332. Under this test,
any person who comes upon property of another for the purpose for
which it is held open to the public is to be considered an invitee
without regard to whether there is any business benefit to either
party. 
2
This "invitee" category was further enlarged by the supreme
court to include "invited social guests" in Wood v. Camp,"' thereby
eliminating the distinction between invitations to the public at
large and to particular individuals. The court refused, however, to
eliminate the category of uninvited licensees-those who come upon
another's premises solely for their own convenience without either
express or implied invitation-noting that, although there was an
overlap between such licensees and trespassers, there were "narrow
distinctions" which justified the retention of the two classes."
Still another category-the invited licensee-appears to have
been recognized by the subsequent Fourth District decision in
Christie v. Anchorage Yacht Haven"' in which the plaintiff sued a
landowner for injuries sustained when he was knocked from his
bicycle by a dog running loose on the defendant's property. In re-
versing a directed verdict for the defendant, the court held that a
jury could reasonably find plaintiff to be a licensee because there
was evidence that persons, regularly and with the implied permis-
sion of the owner, used the path which plaintiff was on when at-
tacked and that the defendant, therefore, had the duty to warn
unwary licensees of the dangerous propensities of the dog.
91. The "mutual economic benefit" test was also stated in McNulty v. Hyrley, 97 So.
2d 185, 188 (court's emphasis) as:
Iwlhether the injured person . . . had present business relations with the owner
of the premises which would render his presence of mutual aid to both. . . .In
the absence of some relation which inures to the mutual benefit of the two or to
that of the owner, no invitation can be implied, and the injured person must be
regarded as a mere licensee.
92. 261 So. 2d 146, 148 (Fla. 1972), adopting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 332
(1965).
93. 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973), modifying sub noam. Camp v. Gulf Counties Gas Co., 265
So. 2d 7:30 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
94. Id. at 695.
95. 287 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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This approach was seemingly rejected by the Second District,
in Libby v. West Coast Rock Co.96 Here the property involved had
been used for mining years before and contained rock pits, but no
warning signs. Although it was used regularly, frequently and
consistently as a "lovers' lane," the court rejected the argument
that the defendant had impliedly invited the citizens of the area to
come upon the property. Moreover, although the court actually con-
sidered plaintiff's decedent to be a trespasser, it would not accept
the argument that a landowner, who knows of the continued use of
the property by trespassers, is held to have knowledge of the partic-
ular trespasser's presence and is thus under a duty to warn of known
dangers not open to ordinary observation. Instead, the court found
it "more appropriate to elevate the status of a trespasser who is
injured on the land to that of [uninvited] licensee."97 The court
then went on to hold that, even if a water-filled pit with steep sides
is a dangerous condition, the landowner can reasonably contemplate
that it will be readily seen"8 and thus affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion.
Although these two cases present basically the same per-
son-one of a class of people who regularly and with knowledge of
the landowner comes upon the landowner's property for his own
purposes-two districts have classified this person differently. One
has termed such visitors invited licensees who, although apparently
not elevated to the status of an invitee, are entitled to a warning by
a landowner of dangers which the visitor cannot be reasonably ex-
pected to discover and of which the landowner is aware. The other
has classified these same people as univited licensees who are enti-
tled to no more care than an undiscovered trespasser.
2. LIABILITY OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
The liability of a landowner to all classes of persons injured on
his land was extended to an independent contractor using the land
in Improved Benevolent & Protected Order of Elks of the World,
96. 308 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
97. Id. at 604.
98. Id. It should be noted, however, that in so doing, the appellate court improperly
passed upon a question of fact because for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, all of the
plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations (to wit, that the landowner should have reasonably fore-
seen that the pit would not be seen) should have been deemed true.
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Inc. v. Delano."' Delano was injured at a picnic hosted and catered
by defendant Kay Smith Catering held on the premises of defendant
Elks. She slipped in a hole while walking across the lawn. The two
defendants had entered into a concession agreement whereby Kay
Smith was given permission to hold the event on the premises and
in turn was charged with the duty of supervising and cleaning the
inside building area to be used by the guests. The defendant Elks
Club was responsible for maintaining the outside picnic grounds,
presumably a continuing responsibility as owner of the premises.
The caterer discovered that the picnic grounds were not in a
"suitable condition" and informed the Elks' manager of this fact.
Neither defendant remedied the defective condition. The court pro-
perly held plaintiff to be "at the very least" a licensee by means of
implied invitation and thus the Elks Club, as owner of the premises,
was held liable for failing to discharge its duty to warn plaintiff of
any dangers of which it was aware. The Third District Court of
Appeal went on to extend prior case law by further holding that the
independent contractor, Kay Smith, was jointly liable with the
owner of the premises for plaintiff's injuries. It based its holding on
the fact that, although Kay Smith was not expressly responsible for
maintenance of the outside premises, it was aware of the "defect"
in the property which caused plaintiff's injury. Thus, liability ap-
pears to have been imposed solely because of that knowledge.00
This extension of liability appears to run afoul of the reasonable
man standard heretofore in force in Florida. It imposed a land-
owner's duty upon a "visiting" independent contractor unfortun-
ate enough to discover, and thus to have knowledge of, a dangerous
condition which the landowner fails to correct, even though the
contractor has no control over the premises. The independent con-
tractor's liability should be measured in terms of what is reasonable
in light of its position as an independent contractor, not by what
would be reasonable for a landowner. Therefore, because Kay Smith
had no responsibility to maintain the outside premises, its course
of action in informing defendant Elks of the dangerous condition
should have been considered reasonable under the circumstances.
99. 308 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
tOO. The trial court had directed a verdict for defendant Kay Smith because it had
construed the concession agreement to impose responsibility upon that defendant only for
those operations over which it personally exercised control; to wit, the inside building area.
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3. ACTIVE OR PASSIVE NEGLIGENCE
In Hix v. Billen,""1 distinction was made, as to a landowner's
liability, between injuries caused by the landowner's active negli-
gence and those caused by the condition of the premises. The Su-
preme Court of Florida held that the distinctions in duty owed by
the owner of premises to invitees relates only to the condition or use
of the landowner's premises and not to injuries caused by the active
conduct or affirmative negligence of the landowner, in which case
the general elements of a negligence action are applicable.
This distinction was ignored by the First District, however, in
Phillips v. Phillips."2 In Phillips, a grandson who was injured while
attending a barbeque at his grandfather's home, sued his grand-
father alleging that the latter's act of carelessly and negligently
using gasoline in an open fire in his presence caused his injuries.
Although the allegations were directed at the defendant's affirma-
tive acts rather than at the condition of the premises, the court
relied on Wood v. Camp"'3 to classify the plaintiff as an invited
social guest entitled to the standard of reasonable care, rather than
treating the case under general elements of negligence.
4. SLIPS AND FALLS
"Slip and fall" cases provide constant examination of the cir-
cumstances under which it is claimed that the required duty of care
is breached. The general rule was restated by the Supreme Court
of Florida in Montgomery v. Florida Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc. "'i
where it was held that an owner of premises will not be liable if the
record fails to show either how the condition was created, the length
of time the condition existed, or that the store owner was responsible
for the condition, unless it can be shown that the dangerous condi-
tion existed for a sufficient length of time to charge defendant with
constructive notice.'
5
101. 284 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1973), denying cert. from 260 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
This case overruled Cochran v. Abercrombie, 118 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960) and similar
past holdings inconsistent with the view adopted by the court.
102. 287 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
103. 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).
104. 281 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1973).
105. See Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. Petterson, 291 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974),
holding that where an owner has no actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition,
liability cannot attach, particularly when the dangerous condition is traceable to acts of
persons other than its employees.
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Moreover, either circumstantial or direct evidence was held to
be sufficient by the Third District in Marlowe v. Food Fair Stores
of Florida, Inc. "'l to give rise to the inference that a foreign sub-
stance which caused plaintiff to fall had been on the floor sufficient
time to charge the store with constructive knowledge of its pres-
ence. '1
7
Despite its holding in Marlowe, however, the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, refused to draw any inferences concerning
breach of duty in a case which offered direct evidence of a dangerous
condition created by hotel employees. In Wirt v. Fountainbleau
Hotel Corp.," the court held that the evidence only supported a
finding that an accident had occurred, despite unrebutted testi-
mony that plaintiff had been forced to walk through water placed
in her path by hotel employees who hosed the area and that she had
fallen on chipped steps as she descended a staircase. Although
plaintiff did not know exactly what made her fall, she testified that
she thought it was a combination of her wet shoes and the chipped
stairs. Therefore, in holding as it did, the court departed from its
own well-established rule that all reasonable inferences should be
drawn from the evidence.
5. FORESEEABLE ACTS OF THIRD PARTIES
A landowner's liability is not limited to injuries resulting from
hidden defects or acts of negligence on his premises, but also in-
cludes those resulting from the foreseeable intentional torts of third
persons.""' Thus, during the survey period, a hotel owner was held
to owe his guests the duty of exercising reasonable care for their
physical safety, whether in their rooms or in common areas,"' and
a store owner was held to have a duty to exercise the same care to
106. 284 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), cert. denied, 291 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1974).
107. A customer was given permission to use the store's toilet facilities, located one flight
of stairs above the store, and slipped while descending. Although plaintiff testified that she
thought she had stepped on a piece of banana, there was no direct evidence regarding what
she slipped on or how long it had been there.
108. :306 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
109. Sparks v. Ober, 192 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 3rd Dist. 1966).
110. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Dorn, 292 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 4th Dist, 1974). In plaintiff's
action for injuries received when beaten and robbed by assailants hiding in his hotel room,
the court held that a hotel owner only owes its invitees the duty of exercising reasonable care
for their safety and not a higher standard.
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protect its patrons from muggings while in a store-owned parking
lot.'"
D. Violation of Statute or Ordinance
The supreme court resolved the often-disputed effect of a statu-
tory violation in de Jesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R." 2 during the
last survey period.I" In de Jesus, the court held that such violations
constituted only prima facie evidence of negligence except where the
statute imposes strict liability"4 or is intended to protect a particu-
lar class of persons from a particular type of injury." 5 The court
reaffirmed its position that violations of child labor laws"' fall
within the former exception, so that a guilty employer will be
deemed negligent per se in a suit by a minor even though there is
no causal relation between the violation of the statute and the in-
jury."7 Therefore, an employer who failed to obtain a special certifi-
cation of employment for a minor as required by statute"' was liable
as a matter of law for injuries to a child while in the course and scope
of employment, even though the employer's failure to obey the stat-
ute was clearly not the proximate cause of the minor's injury."
9
The violation of a statute requiring the bottoms and sides of
swimming pools to be light in color"" did not constitute negligence
per se in an action for the drowning death of plaintiff's decedent in
111. Rotbart v. Jordan Marsh Co., 305 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). Plaintiff store
patron was held to have stated a cause of action against store owners for injuries received
from a mugging in the store's covered parking lot.
112. 281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973).
113. For a complete discussion of the case, see Beckham & Esquiroz, Torts, 1974 Survey
of Florida Law, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 662, 669-71 (1974); 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 719 (1974).
114. Statutes which impose "strict liability" are those statutes designed to protect a
particular class of persons from their inability to protect themselves. 281 So. 2d at 201.
115. In such cases, the plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons that the statute
was intended to protect, the injury must be of the type that the statute was designed to
prevent and the violation of the statute must be the proximate cause of the injury. Id.
116. FLA. STAT. §§ 450.011 et. seq. (1971).
117. Sloan v. Coit Int'l, Inc., 292 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1974).
118. FLA. STAT. § 450.111(2) (1973) provides that
Inlo minor between twelve and sixteen years of age shall be employed, permitted
or suffered to work in any gainful occupation, except in domestic service in private
homes, in farmwork, or . . . during the hours when the public schools are not in
session, unless the person . . . employing such minor shall procure and keep on
file at the place of the minor's employment, a special certificate of employ-
ment. . ..
119. Sloan v. Coit Int'l, Inc., 292 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1974).
120. FIA. STAT. § 514.02 (1973) and FLA. AnM[N. CODE § 1OD-5.07 (1975).
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a pool with a mural painted on the bottom.'2' Since the purpose of
the statute was not the protection of a class of persons, but rather
the promotion of sanitation, health and cleanliness, the court con-
cluded that a person who could not see the bottom of the pool when
he dove in was not intended to be protected.
E. Building Contractors and Architects
A road contractor owes motorists the duty to maintain a high-
way under construction in a reasonably safe condition for drivers
who are vigilant to observe obstructions incident to its work. Thus
a cause of action was stated against a contractor by a taxi cab driver
who had collided with a raised portion of a draw-bridge while the
bridge was under construction.' 2
The contractor is liable only for his negligence, however; thus
a failure to show that he created the defect will relieve him of liabil-
ity, such as where the plaintiff fails to prove that a stop sign whose
absence led to an accident was removed by the defendant contrac-
tor. 123
The Supreme Court of Florida afforded contractors a further
measure of relief at the expense of architects by holding the latter
liable for those financial damages suffered by contractors if proxi-
mately caused by the architect's negligent design or preparation of
plan, despite a lack of privity.' 24 This merely added still one more
exception to an already exception-riddled rule.
Although recognizing that the lack of privity had traditionally
barred such claims, except where a third party plaintiff had sus-
tained personal injury so that the case could be viewed under prod-
ucts liability theory, the court noted that the requirement of privity
had been overcome in the developing concept of tort liability under
the MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co."'2 line of cases. In so holding,
the court relied on United States ex rel Los Angeles Testing Labora-
tory v. Rogers & Rogers,' a federal district court decision in which
121. Kelly v. Koppers Co., 293 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 302 So. 2d
415 (Fla. 1974).
122. Zilber Cab Co. v. Capeletti Bros., 303 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
123. Garcia v. L. C. Morris, Inc., 306 So. 2d 5.45 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
124. A. R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973). The question was originally
certified to the Supreme Court of Florida by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 443 F.2d 434
(5th Cir. 1971). For a final disposition of the case, see 492 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1974).
125. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
126. 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
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a cause of action was held to have been stated against an architect
under contract to the United States government by a contractor who
sustained economic damages when concrete approved by the archi-
tect and used in the project by the contractor, failed. Liability was
based on the control held by the architect over the construction
project.
F. Husband and Wife
Florida's adherence to the interspousal immunity doctrine,
under which one spouse is immune to liability for torts committed
against the other during the course of their marraige even where the
parties are no longer married at the time of the action, was reaf-
firmed by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Heaton
v. Heaton.'7 Although noting that the doctrine of interspousal im-
munity has been abolished in the majority of jurisdictions and that
Florida, in retaining it, is now in the minority, the district court
nonetheless deferred to the Florida Supreme Court's affirmation of
the doctrine in Bencomo v. Bencomo.
2
8
Inroads were made, however, into the doctrine by the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, in holding that, if the defense of
interspousal immunity is not affirmatively pleaded, it will be con-
sidered waived, unless there is "a strong showing of the unavailabil-
ity of knowledge of the substance of the defense," in which case it
may be asserted after the cause has been set for trial. 21
III. AUTOMOBILES
A. The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine, under which the
owner of a motor vehicle is held liable for its negligent operation by
a driver using the vehicle with the owner's permission,"" was ex-
panded by the Fourth District with its rejection of the contention
that the doctrine only applied to vehicles operated on public
streets.'' Stating that the characterization of a dangerous instru-
127. 304 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
128. 200 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). Here, too, the parties
were divorced at the time of the action.
129. DeGuido v. DeGuido, 308 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
130. This doctrine originated in Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86
So. 629 (1920).
131. Reid v. Associated Eng'r, Inc., 295 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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mentality does not change depending on where it is operated,' 2 the
court held that the owner of a vehicle who lent it to an employee
would be liable for any injuries caused by the negligence of the
employee in failing to prevent his child from putting the truck into
gear while parked in the employee's front yard. 3 ' The case was
remanded to the trial court to determine whether the employee was,
in fact, negligent.
Liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine was
held not to extend to punitive damages in Waldron v. Kirkland,'34
where a stepfather was sued for injuries caused by his stepson who,
unknown to the stepfather, drove the family car under the influence
of liquor. The court reasoned that since the doctrine was premised
upon the theory of compensating a victim, the imposition of puni-
tive damages upon one without fault and only vicariously liable was
not within its scope.
The Second District also refused to extend the dangerous in-
strumentality doctrine to the owners of horses, where a minor, riding
his friend's horse with permission, ran into an automobile and in-
jured plaintiff, a passenger."'
B. The Guest Statute
Following repeal of the Guest Statute,'36 under which a motor
vehicle "guest" ' was precluded from recovery against its driver in
the absence of the latter's gross negligence or willful and wanton
misconduct, passengers became entitled to recovery for the simple
negligence of their drivers even though the accidents'38 and original
132. Id. at 128.
133. It is interesting to note that the injured plaintiff was the child's mother and the
employee's wife. Thus, the husband's employer was vicariously liable to the plaintiff-wife,
even though the primary tort-feasor, the husband-employee, was insulated from liability
tinder the interspousal immunity doctrine. For further discussion of this doctrine see section
I,F, supra.
134. 281 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
135. Moessinger v. ,Johnson, 292 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974). The issue of whether
the owner was independently negligent in failing to ascertain the competence of the rider was
not raised at trial. Id. at 608.
136. FJ.A. STAT. § 320.59 (1971), repealed, Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-1, § 1.
137. FIA. S'rAT. § 320.59 (1971) had excluded both passengers payingfor their transporta-
tion and school children on their way to school (or places of learning), from the operation of
the statute and therefore implicitly defines a guest as any other passenger in a motor vehicle.
138. Ingerson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 272 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973);




trials"!' occurred before the repeal.
A cause of action was thus held by the Fourth District to have
been stated in Carr v. Crosby Builders Supply Company,4 5 where
the action was brought and tried while the statute was still in effect
and the plaintiff failed to prove either the gross negligence or willful
and wanton misconduct of the operator. By the time of appeal,
however, the statute had been repealed and thus the appellate
court, deciding the case in accordance with the law at the time of
appeal, held it sufficient to allege only simple negligence in order
to state a cause of action.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, reached the same
result in Arich v. McTague,'4' in which the accident occurred while
the statute was still in effect, and where entry of summary judgment
followed the repeal. Plaintiff alleged both simple and gross negli-
gence and the trial court, finding neither gross negligence nor any
exception to the guest statute, granted summary judgment in favor
of defendants. The appellate court based its reversal on Ingerson v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.'42 which had been
tried ten days after repeal of the statute and had held it error for
the trial judge to charge the jury that the plaintiff would be required
to prove gross negligence.
C. No-Fault Law
The Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act' provided for
the tort immunity of negligent parties in motor vehicle accidents
falling under certain declared thresholds,' directed insurers to
compensate their own insureds for both personal and property inju-
ries without regard to fault"' and raised the minimum required
139. Carr v. Crosby Builders Supply Co., 283 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
140. Id.
141. 292 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
142. 272 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). The Gingersen court had also stated that the
rule of simple negligence would apply even if a change occurred in the law after judgment
but during the pendency of a direct appeal therefrom.
143. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as the No-Fault Acti.
144. A tort suit is still allowed under the No-Fault Act if the plaintiff's medical expenses
for personal injury exceed $1,000 or if a permanent injury or death results. FLA. STAT. §
627.737(2) (1973). These thresholds also apply to derivative claims; thus, where an injured
child suffers no permanent injury and its parents do not incur medical expenses in excess of
$1,000, neither may bring suit. Marquez v. Mederos, 307 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
145. FLA. STAT. § 627.731 (1973) states that
the purpose of [the No-Fault Act] is to require medical, surgical, funeral and
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insurance coverage of all state drivers. '
Constitutional challenges to the No-Fault Act commenced
almost immediately.147 In Kluger v. White, 4 ' the property damage
section of the Act,'49 which did not make property coverage manda-
tory but which barred actions by car owners choosing not to elect
such coverage unless their claims exceeded $550, was successfully
attacked on the ground that it violated the Florida Constitution, ""
because it deprived such car owners of a remedy without providing
a substitute.
Kluger, who maintained only liability insurance on her car, had
damages well exceeding the threshold but, since repair costs in ex-
cess of a vehicle's fair market value are not recoverable, potential
recovery was limited to $250, the fair market value of the car. De-
spite the legality of her failure to purchase property damage insur-
ance, Kluger was denied the right to sue to recover the costs of
repairing her car and was therefore left remediless. The failure on
the part of the legislature to provide a reasonable alternative to
protect the rights of such car owners who chose not to purchase
property coverage and who suffered damages below the $550 thresh-
old, and the failure to show an "overpowering public necessity" for
abrogating the common law right to sue in tort, resulted in the
supreme court's declaration of the section's unconstitutionality
under article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution.''
The next attack assailed section 627.737, which denies recovery
for pain and suffering under the Act, thereby limiting the recovery
of such damages to situations where the threshold requirements'52
are met and the plaintiff sues in tort outside the Act. This attack
disability insurance benefits to be provided without regard to fault. . . and, with
respect to motor vehicle accidents, a limitation on the right to claim damages for
pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience.
146. FLA. STAT. § 627.733 (1973). The required protection must comply with the provi-
sions of the "Financial Responsibility Law," FLA. STAT. § 324.021(7) (1973) which (as
amended to become effective July 1, 1975) calls for minimum insurance protection in the
amount of $15,000 for bodily injury or death per person, $30,000 per accident, and $5,000 for
property damage.
147. Similar attacks were mounted in Illinois. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Il.2d 478, 283 N.E.
2d 474 (1972) (held unconstitutional in its entirety).
148. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
149. FLA. STAT. § 627.738 (1971).
150. FiL,. CONST. art. I, § 21 provides that "[tlhe court shall be open to every person
for redress of any injury. .. ."
151. 281 So. 2d at 4 (Fla. 1973).
152. See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
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was rejected, however, in Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co. '' by
the Supreme Court of Florida which held that the personal injury
aspects of the No-Fault Act, with one exception, were constitu-
tional. Unlike the property damage section found unconstitutional
in Kluger because of the legislature's failure to provide a reasonable
alternative to the barred action in tort, the personal injury section
provided such an alternative because it required all motor vehicle
owners to carry a minimum level of insurance.154 Thus, injured in-
sureds who cannot recover damages for pain and suffering because
they fail to meet the threshold criteria are still afforded prompt
recovery of their out-of-pocket losses regardless of fault. 55
The plaintiff did, however, prevail in having the alternative
threshold test of section 627.737(2) struck down as a denial of equal
protection.' 6 That section had allowed suit, absent medical expen-
ses in excess of $1,000, permanent injury or death, if
...the injury or disease consists in whole or in part of. . . a
fracture to a weight-bearing bone, [or] a compound, commi-
nuted, displaced or compressed fracture ... .
The determination of whether the threshold requirements are
met, thereby allowing an action in tort, is a question of fact for the
jury, rather than one of law for the trial court as held in Allstate
Insurance Company v. Ruiz.' Defendant had raised plaintiffs fail-
ure to qualify under the Act as an affirmative defense to plaintiff's
tort action based on an allegation of permanent injury, but the trial
judge ruled as a matter of law that plaintiff had met the threshold
requirements for suit and therefore did not instruct the jury upon
the issue of whether plaintiff's suit was barred. In order to expedite
the case, the judge submitted an interrogatory to the jury, asking
whether the plaintiff was permanently injured. Although the jury
returned a verdict for plaintiff, it found no permanent injury. On
153. 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
154. FLA. STAT. § 627.733(3) (1973) requires each owner to have either (a) insurance
complying with the "Financial Responsibility Law," (FLA. STAT. ch. 324), or (b) any other
method approved by the department of insurance and affording the equivalent of an insur-
ance policy.
155. FLA. STAT. § 627.736 (1973). The insurance companies are required to pay, inter alia,
medical, hospital, disability, and death benefits within 30 days of receiving written notice
of a covered loss and the amount thereof. See also FLA. STAT. § 627.733 (1973).
156. 296 So. 2d at 20.
157. FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) (1971).
158. 305 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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appeal, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was not entitled
to the verdict as the jury had determined the factual issue against
him. The plaintiff defended the trial judge's initial determination
by relying on Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co. " and argued that
once the determination is made, the trial should not be frustrated
by submitting the question to the jury. The District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, properly found that Lasky did not authorize
the determination of the factual question by the court to the exclu-
sion of the jury and held the matter to be one of fact for the jury to
decide.
IV. LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS
A. Dogs
The Florida "Dog Bite Statute,""" which imposes strict liabil-
ity upon owners for dog bites' as well as "liability for any damage
done by their dogs to . . .domestic animals or livestock, or to per-
sons . .," " was broadly construed by the District Court of Appeal,
Third District. An owner was held to be strictly liable for his Great
Dane which ran into the street causing the plaintiff to lose control
of his car in an attempt to avoid the animal and, as a result, to crash
into a telephone pole.' "s By reading these two sections together to
find strict liability under the general damage section of the statute
for injuries not caused by dog bites, the court restricted an owner's
defenses under this section to provocation of the dog and lack of
proximate cause. "4
An alternative theory of liability was found by the Fourth Dis-
trict, which refused to apply the "Dog Bite Statute" to a landowner
who allowed an employee's dog to run loose on its property, but
nevertheless held that the landowner would be liable under general
tort law if: (1) he had knowledge of the dangerous condition caused
by the unrestrained German Shepherd; (2) the plaintiff had implied
159. 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974). The reliance appears misplaced, as the question of who
determines whether a plaintiff has met the threshold requirements for suit was not before the
Laskv court.
160. FI.A. STAT. §§ 767.01..04 (1973).
161. FI.A. STAr. § 767.04 (1973). An owner may avoid such liability only where his dog
has been provoked by the victim or where he posts a "Bad Dog" sign on his premises.
162. FI.A. SrAT. § 767.01 (1973).
163. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Greenstein, 308 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
164. Id. at 563. The court relied on the finding that there was some affirmative action
on the part of the dog and that this action proximately caused plaintiff's injuries.
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permission to be on defendant's property; and (3) the dangerous
condition created by the dog could not have been reasonably discov-
ered by the plaintiff."'
B. Trespassing Cattle
The constitutionality of the Warren Act,'66 which replaced the
common law strict liability of livestock owners for damages caused
by their trespassing cattle with statutory liability which is invoked
only where such owner intentionally or negligently allows its live-
stock to stray upon a public road, was attacked as a denial of equal
protection in Selby v. Bullock." 7 Plaintiff contended that since
there was no distinction between persons injured by virtue of the
presence of dogs upon public roads and persons injured by cattle
upon the same roads, the statute should be stricken because it cre-
ated an unconstitutional discrimination. The cc -rt relied upon the
legislature's expression of policy as promoting the livestock industry
to uphold the new standard of negligence imposed upon the owner
of straying livestock while continuing to hold dog owners strictly
liable for injuries caused by their animals. The court went on to
point out that where a statute applies equally and uniformly to all
persons similarly situated (here the class of persons injured by cat-
tle), the constitutional requirements relating to equal protection are
satisfied.
Justice Ervin dissented, stating that "[t]he Warren Act was
intended to prohibit per se cattle from trespassing on public
roads."'' For this reason, he felt that the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur should be applicable and that even if the technical prerequisites
of res ipsa are not satisfied, negligence should be inferred as a mat-
ter of law."'
69
165. Christie v. Anchorage Yacht Haven, Inc., 287 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). For
a full discussion of a landowner's duty to various classes of visitors on his premises, see notes
89-98 supra and accompanying text.
166. FLA. STAT. § 588.15 (1973) provides that
lelvery owner of livestock who intentionally, wilfully, carelessly or negligently
suffers or permits such livestock to run at large upon or stray upon the public
roads of this state shall be liable in damages for all injury and property damage
sustained by any person by reason thereof.
167. 287 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1973).
168. Id. at 23. The dissent refers the reader to de Jesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R.,
281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973), discussed at note 112, supra.
169. Id.
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C. Wild Animals
A plaintiff is barred from recovery against the owners of wild
or abnormally dangerous domestic animals only if he intentionally
and unreasonably subjects himself to risk of harm by such ani-
mals.'7 ' In all other cases the strict liability doctrine applies to the
owner or keeper of a wild animal and the plaintiff is not required to
allege specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendant.'7'
Thus, when defendant kept his snake collection on public display
in an unlocked box at his service station and the plaintiff was bitten
by a rattlesnake when he put his hand into the box, defendant was
found liable. The plaintiff's allegation that he did not realize the
dangers involved when he put his hand in the unlocked box contain-
ing the snake collection was held sufficient to state a cause of action
under the theory of strict liability. 7 '
V. INTENTIONAL TORTS
A. Malicious Prosecution
In order to sustain an action for malicious prosecution a plain-
tiff must show: (1) commencement or continuance of an original
civil or criminal judicial proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the
present defendant against the plaintiff; (3) its bona fide termination
in favor of the plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such
prosecution; (5) the presence of malice; and (6) resulting damage to
the plaintiff.'73
Under the "reasonable man standard," an absence of proxi-
mate cause may be found where defendant fails to investigate ade-
quately and it would appear to a reasonably cautious man that
further investigation is necessary before instituting a proceeding.
Thus, a directed verdict for defendant was held improper where
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 484 (1965) has been adopted in Florida by Issacs
v. Powell, 267 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972), which provides that
(1) A plaintiff is not barred from recovery by his failure to exercise reasonable
care to observe the propinquity of a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous
domestic animal or to avoid harm to his person, land or chattels threatened by
it.
(2) A plaintiff is barred from recovery by intentionally and unreasonably sub-
jecting himself to the risk that a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domes-
tic animal will do harm to his person, land or chattels.
171. Accord, Hall v. Richardo, 297 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
172. Keyser v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 287 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
173. Kelly v. Millers of Orlando, Inc., 294 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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plaintiff, a man in the waste paper collection business, had sued a
store for malicious prosecution. The store, without making an inves-
tigation, had pressed charges against him for theft after he removed
a box containing waste paper and concealed clothing from a store-
room in which his wife worked.' The court pointed out that an
investigation could have been quickly and easily conducted and
would have revealed that his wife had little or no opportunity to
place the clothing in the trash box.
Moreover, satisfaction of the malice element does not require
proof of actual malicious intent, but may be satisfied by legal malice
which may be implied or inferred from defendant's conduct or from
a lack of proximate cause. ' Thus, a jury verdict granting both
compensatory and punitive damages was reinstated when the Su-
preme Court of Florida held that an award of punitive damages in
an action for malicious prosecution was supported by proof of legal
malice as opposed to proof of spite or ill-will. The court cautioned
that while such legal malice will be sufficient to support an award
of compensatory damages, it may not be sufficient to imply the
malice necessary for punitive damages.'76
A lack of probable cause, however, will not be found merely by
the ultimate discharge of the defendant.' Probable cause to insti-
tute civil or criminal action does not require that one need be certain
of its outcome, but only that there be
[rleasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged.'76
Therefore, the mere termination of criminal proceedings in one's
favor will be insufficient to support an action for malicious prosecu-
tion where the plaintiff is discharged because the identifying wit-
ness does not appear at trial.
B. Defamation: Libel and Slander
Communication or publication is an essential element in all
defamation cases and such communication may take many forms.
174. Id.
175. Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1974).
176. Id. at 51-52.
177. Davis v. 7-Eleven Food Stores, Inc., 294 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
178. 294 So. 2d at 112, quoting Dunnavant v. State, 46 So. 2d 871, 874 (Fla. 1950).
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A letter to a "consumer action" column was considered sufficient
publication in Tyler v. Garris75 to state a cause of action for libel
against the purchaser of a boat from a marina owner, who later
wrote such a letter accusing the marina owner of selling a stolen
boat, operating an unscrupulous firm and wrongfully depriving him
of $750.
Malice, another essential element of libel, is presumed as a
matter of law and need not be specially proved where a published
defamatory falsehood is without privilege and libelous per se, ruled
the Supreme Court of Florida in the continuing saga of Firestone v.
Time, Inc. 8" Suit was commenced after Time Magazine refused to
print a retraction requested by Mrs. Firestone'' of a news item
which incorrectly stated that she had been divorced' on grounds
of adultery.
The trial court had submitted to the jury the question of malice
or reckless disregard on the part of the publisher; this issue was
found in favor of Mrs. Firestone. The supreme court pointed out
that, without a privilege, the article was libelous per sell3 so that
malice did not have to be shown.' 4 In restating the jury verdict for
plaintiff, the court concluded that
[a] careful examination of the final decree prior to publication
would have clearly demonstrated that the divorce had been
granted on the grounds of extreme cruelty, and thus the wife
would have been saved the humiliation of being accused of adul-
tery in a nationwide magazine. This is a flagrant example of
"journalistic negligence. ' **
179. 292 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
180. 305 So. 2d 172, 177 (Fla. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1557 (1975). The history of
the case is detailed in Beckham & Esquiroz, Torts, Survey of Florida Law, 28 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 662, 696-98 (1974).
181. FLA. STAT. § 770.71 (1973) requires written notice specifying the offending state-
ments to be served upon the defendant as a condition precedent to bringing a libel action
against a newspaper or periodical.
182. Time's argument that the item was within the protected ambit given to publications
of judicial proceedings was rejected because that qualified privilege is available only if the
reports are fair, impartial and accurate. 305 So. 2d at 177.
183. The false accusation that a woman is guilty of adultery is libelous per se. 305 So.
2d at 175. It also imputes that one has committed a criminal offense. See FLA. STAT. § 798.01
(1973).
184. 305 So. 2d at 176.
185. Id. at 178.
** After the writing of this survey but prior to printing, the United States Supreme Court
vacated and remanded Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976). The case was remanded
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A publication's liability for libel was further expanded in
Helton v. United Press International,' in which Florida adopted
the newest restriction on the doctrine of New York Times v.
Sullivan 7 as mandated by the United States Supreme Court in
Gertz v. Welch.' Under Gertz, the privilege created by Sullivan
was held not to apply in a defamation action by a citizen who is
neither a public official nor a public figure, because in such cases
the first amendment does not require a plaintiff to prove either
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth on the part of
the defendant. Accordingly, the District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, noting that plaintiff Helton was not a public official nor a
public figure, applied the Gertz standard in holding that the plain-
tiff need not prove the pre-Gertz requisites of either knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth by the defendant.",9 In
accordance with Gertz, however, the plaintiff was limited to com-
pensatory damages for injury to his reputation, since knowledge of
the falsity or reckless disregard for the truth by the defendant are
still held to be essential elements for punitive damages.
An unsuccessful candidate for re-election to the Key West
Commission in 1971 was, however, definitely within the public offi-
cial category. "" Thus, a newspaper sued by the candidate for pub-
lishing advertisements which were alleged to be libelous 9' was pro-
tected by the New York Times doctrine absent a showing that the
publication was made with actual malice or that the publisher "en-
because no finding of fault on the part of Time, Inc., in its publication of the defamatory
material was ever found by a Florida trial or appellate court as required by Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., note 188 infra.
The court held that Mrs. Firestone was not a "public figure" within the framework of
analysis discussed in Gertz, therefore Time; Inc., did not fall within the protection enunciated
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as extended by Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The court also held that the New York Times privilege
does not automatically extend to all reports of judicial proceedings.
186. 303 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
187. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Times doctrine requires that a showing of actual malice
-knowledge that the communication is false or reckless disregard of its truth or falsity-be
made under the first amendment in a libel action by a public official. The Court's subsequent
decision in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), further extended this qualified
privilege to "public figures."
188. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
189. 303 So. 2d at 651.
190. Menendez v. Key West Newspaper Corp., 293 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
191. The advertisements charged that Menendez was apparently un-American and that
he displayed pro-Castro Communist allegiance.
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tertained serious doubt" with respect to the truth of the publica-
tion.'9
C. Conversion
Conversion, the intentional exercise over a chattel of dominion
or control which seriously interferes with the right of another to
control it,' was extended to include towing companies which insist
upon being paid towing and storage charges before returning a car
to its owner, where the company has acted at the request of a private
citizen, such as an apartment manager." 4 Under such circumstan-
ces, the towing company acquires no lien on the car for towing and
storage charges because there is no agreement with the owner and
no statute creating such a lien,'95 and therefore, if the company
refuses to return the car to its owner upon his demand, it will be
liable for conversion.'96 The towing company's argument that the
owner should have paid the charges to mitigate damages and then
filed suit was rejected because
[wihere property has been converted an attempt to plead and
prove a qualified return in mitigation of the damages is not per-
missible, since one who wrongfully converts personalty should not
be allowed to state a condition with which the owner of the prop-
erty is bound to comply in order to have the property returned
to him.'97
Nor can a defendant escape liability for conversion by offering
substitute property for that agreed upon under contract. In Hanna
v. American International Land Corp.,'" a vendee entered into a
land sales contract for two waterfront lots. After all payments were
made, the vendor declined to offer the agreed-upon deed, but in-
stead offered substitute lots. Upon discovering that his lots were an
integral part of a golf course, the vendee brought suit seeking both
192. 293 So. 2d at 752.
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 A (1) (1965).
194. Murrell v. Trio Towing Service, Inc., 294 So.2d 331 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
195. Nor is there a common law lien on an automobile for towing and storage. A statutory
lien would be created, however, if the car were towed pursuant to a police request, under FLA.
STAT. § 85.031 (1973).
196. 294 So. 2d at 333 n.3. The court noted that the towing company must look to the
apartment owner for compensation, who presumably will then bring an action against the car
owner for trespass.
197. Id. at 333, quoting 89 C.J.S. Trover & Conversion § 186 (1955).
198. 289 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
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compensatory and punitive damages for breach of contract based
upon defendant's willful conversion of the lots. The District Court
of Appeal, Second District, reversed the trial court's striking of
plaintiff's claim for punitive damages and held that such damages
are proper where acts constituting a breach of contract also amount
to an independent cause of action in tort.
At the end of the survey period, the Fourth District rendered a
decision ' which removed conversion from the ambit of Florida
Statues, section 768.041(1) which provides that
[a] release or covenant not to sue as to one (1) tort-feasor for
property damage to, personal injury of, or the wrongful death of
any person shall not operate to release or discharge the liability
of any other tort-feasor who may be liable for the same tort or
death. (emphasis added)
The court reasoned that the words "for property damage to,
personal injury of, or the wrongful death of any person" were placed
in the statute as words of limitation because the legislature had not
intended to abolish entirely the common law rule that a release of
one joint tort-feasor acted as a discharge of all the others; thus, the
common law rule would continue to prevail as to all cases not within
these expressed limitations. Therefore, the court concluded that
since conversion is a wrongful deprivation of property and not
merely damage to or depreciation of the property, it did not come
within the meaning of "damage to property of any person" within
the statute.2 "
This reasoning was attacked by a strong dissent which argued
that when one person converts another's property, the latter has in
fact suffered injury to his property. Citing numerous cases where the
term "injury to property" has included conversion in various con-
texts, the dissent concluded that the terms "damage" and "injury"
are synonymous. Thus, there was no valid reason or intent on the
part of the legislature to exclude conversion from the operation of
the statute.2 "
VI. NUISANCE
Nuisances may be either public or private. As a rule, a public
199. Sun First Nat'l Bank v. Batchelor, 308 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
200. Id. at 652.
201. Id. at 653.
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nuisance affects the public at large and violates public rights or
causes damage to the public generally. A private nuisance, on the
other hand, is an interference with an individual's use and enjoy-
ment of property.'"'
At the end of the survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida
reaffirmed its adherence to the common law rule that an action to
abate a public nuisance may be brought by a private individual,
only when such an individual has suffered some special injury, dif-
ferent from that suffered by the public at large.' 3 The State, acting
through the attorney general, may generally bring such an action
even though the specific condition being attacked is not enumerated
under the heading of a nuisance within the state statutes.0 4
An industrially created nuisance is not privileged from attack
merely because there is no known technological or economically
feasible method of abating the nuisance short of stopping the activ-
ity. Thus, in St. Regis Paper Co. v. Pollution Control Board, ' '
which involved a Pollution Control Board order declaring the defen-
dant company guilty of violating the Florida Administrative Code
by discharging materials into the affected waters "producing color
.. . in such degree as to create a nuisance,"20 the court rejected the
company's argument that there could be no finding of nuisance
inasmuch as no known economically feasible method to eliminate
the color-causing materials existed.
VII. DAMAGES
The purpose of awarding punitive damages to an injured party
is to punish the wrongdoer, rather than to compensate the injured
party.'"7 Thus, the Third District has held that exemplary damages
are not recoverable as part of a parent's derivative claim based upon
injury to a minor. "' Surprisingly, however, the First District has
allowed the recovery of such damages where defendant's liability
was based purely on the theory of respondeat superior,2 " even
202. 23 FLA. JUR. Nuisances § 6 (1959).
203. United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974), rev'g
281 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
204. State ex rel. Shevin v. Morgan, 289 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
205. 298 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
206. 298 So. 2d at 218.
207. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Odoms, 306 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
208. City Stores Co. v. Langer, 308 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
209. Elyria-Lorain Broadcasting Co. v. National Communications Indus., Inc., 300 So.
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though this theory of liability is founded upon the principle of
compensation, rather than of punishment.
The major difficulty faced by the courts as regards punitive
damages has been the determination of the amount of the award.
Although a verdict for nominal damages has been considered suffi-
cient to support a verdict for punitive damages," ' a split of author-
ity presently exists as regards the relationship between the two
amounts. t ' During the survey period, the Third District adopted the
rule that while it is within the jury's province to fix the award, the
sum should bear some reasonable relation to the compensatory
damages award."'
An essential element of proving a case in intentional tort where
punitive damages are recoverable is malice; however,
deliberate violence or oppression are not prerequisites for assess-
ment of exemplary damages . . . where the wrongful act is such
as to imply malice, or when from great indifference to persons,
property or rights of others malice is imputable to the wrong-
doer."'
In such cases it is thus error for a punitive damage award to be set
aside on the basis that there is no evidence of actual malice.'"
The same theory applies to an award of punitive damages based
upon gross negligence. There is an affinity between gross negligence
and wanton and willful misconduct sufficient to support an award
of punitive damages." '
Analogously, the fact that the plaintiff is found to have suffered
no compensatory damages will not bar his right to receive punitive
damages in an action for slander per se2 ' because
2d 716 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974). The amount of punitive damages was limited by the court,
however, because of the nature of liability.
210. Id.
211. Compare Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959) with Scalise v.
National Util. Serv., 120 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1941) and Ging v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 293
F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Fla. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 423 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1970).
212. Air Line Employees Ass'n Int'l v. Turner, 291 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). Award
of $175,000 in punitive damages was reversed where the plaintiff only received a verdict of
$3,000 in compensatory damages.
213. Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1974), quoting Wrains v. Rose, 175 So.
2d 75, 79 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
214. Id.
215. LaFleur v. Castlewood Int'l Corp., 294 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
216. Saunders Hardware Five & Ten, Inc. v. Low, 307 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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the requirement of a showing of actual damages as a basis of an
award of exemplary damages is satisfied by the presumption of
injury which arises from a showing of libel or slander that is
actionable per se.217
Moreover, the purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate,
but to deter by punishment."'
Closely related to the award of punitive damages is the allow-
ance of recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In World Insurance Co. v. Wright,"' the plaintiff was held to have
stated a cause of action for such damages against his insurer whose
actions, including attempts to "buy up" the policy, reflected such
bad faith as to justify damages for the intentional infliction of
mental distress. It is interesting to note that in Wright, only a two-
party insurance contract was involved. Florida courts have gener-
ally limited the award of punitive damages in actions based on
insurance contracts to three-party situations, finding the insurer's
failure to settle with the third party a breach of its fiduciary duty.',"
Thus, if this restriction on punitive damages is to remain, Wright
may present an alternative method for insureds to recover those
"intangible" damages which in fact are part of punitive damages,
even though punitive damages are not recoverable.
VIII. GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY
A. Sovereign Immunity
The Florida legislature delivered a damaging blow to the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity by enacting a tort claims act during its
1973 session, which partially waived sovereign immunity in actions
against the state and its agencies and subdivisions.' Defining the
term "subdivisions" to include municipalities,2 the act provides
that:
217. Id. at 894.
218. Id.
219. 308 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
220. See, e.g., Baxter v. Royal Indem. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
221. The waiver under the act only applies to actions against the executive departments
accruing on or after July 1, 1974 and to actions against all other agencies and subdivisions of
the state accruing on or after January 1, 1975. FLA. STAT. § 768.30 (Supp. 1974).
222. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(2) (Supp. 1974) defines subdivisions to include "the executive
departments, the legislature, the judicial branch and the independent establishments of the
state; counties and municipalities and corporations acting primarily as instrumentalities or
agencies of the state, counties or municipalities."
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[aictions of law against the state or any of its agencies or subdi-
visions to recover damages in tort. . . for injury or loss of prop-
erty, personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the agency or subdivision
while acting within the scope of his office or employment under
circumstances in which the state or such agency or subdivision,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the general laws of this state, may be prosecuted subject to
the limitations specified in this act.23
The limitations specified in the act do, however, preserve the
doctrine of sovereign immunity to a noticeable extent. The act ex-
empts the state and its subdivisions from punitive damages and
further limits liability to $50,000 per claimant and $100,000 per
incident, 24 unless the governmental entity carries liability insur-
ance covering the injuries in excess of these amounts, in which case
its liability limitation will be co-extensive with its insurance cover-
age. 2
5
Moreover, implicit in the wording of the statute is the apparent
further limitation that a state or its subdivisions may only be held
liable for torts committed within the exercise of ministerial, execu-
tive or administrative functions, because the act only waives im-
munity in "circumstances in which . . . a private person would be
liable. ' 2 1 Under the common law of Florida, a private individual
cannot be held liable for torts committed in the exercise of judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or quasi-legislative functions. 27
The tort claims act also limits the personal liability of officers
or employees of the state or its subdivision while acting within the
scope of their employment, to actions committed either in bad faith
or in willful and wanton disregard of human rights and safety.2 8
With the exception of the existence of this implicit limitation
to torts arising from governmental functions, the effect of the act
223. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (Supp. 1974).
224. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (Supp. 1974).
225. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(10) (Supp. 1974).
226. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (Supp. 1974).
227. Allen v. Secor, 195 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967), Hough v. Amato, 260 So. 2d
537 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). Although it might be argued that the tort liability of a private indivi-
dual is not coextensive with that of a public official, Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So.
2d 70 (Fla. 1967), a private individual could never exercise legislative, quasi-legislative,
judicial, or quasi-judicial functions except as a public official.
228. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9) (Supp. 1974).
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upon the state and its agencies is fairly clear."'9 Its effect upon the
tort liability of municipal corporations, however, is not as clear.
Prior to the act, judicial decisions had limited a municipal corpora-
tion's shield of sovereign immunity to torts resulting from the exer-
cise of its legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, without the $50,000/$100,000 limit created by the tort
claims act. :"' The unanswered question, therefore, arises as to
whether the act effectively modifies the partial common law abroga-
tion by returning a degree of sovereign immunity to municipalities.
Although no appellate court has answered this question, the word-
ing of the statute would appear to require an affirmative answer
because of its failure to distinguish between the state and municipal




Despite the partial judicial waiver of sovereign immunity of
municipal corporations prior to the tort claims act, pre-act cases
arising during the survey period demonstrate that a municipality's
liability is not as broad as might be imagined.
The question of whether a police officer who injures another
with his service revolver while "off-duty" acted within the scope of
his employment was held to be a question for the jury in Gardner
v. Saunders.232 Saunders, a policeman, had just gone off duty and
had settled himself in a local bar with a drink when an altercation
erupted. As a result, Saunders shot the plaintiff with his service
revolver, which he was required by city regulation to carry at all
times.23 The Second District reasoned that "such regulations carry
with them a reasonable presumption that he might be in a position
229. Prior to the passage of the tort claims act, FLA. STAT. § 455.06 (1957) provided that
state agencies could purchase liability insurance for certain risks and that sovereign immun-
ity would be waived to the extent of its insurance for covered injuries.
230. In Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957), the Supreme Court
of Florida held that when an individual suffers a direct personal injury, proximately caused
by the negligence of a municipal employee while acting within the scope of his employment,
the injured individual may maintain an action against the municipality for redress. City of
Miami v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1965) expanded Hargrove to include intentional torts
committed by municipal employees acting within the scope of their employment.
231. See note 222 supra.
232. 281 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
233. The reasoning behind this regulation was that a policeman is always on duty, even
though he is periodically relieved from the routine performance of it. Id. at 393.
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to use his revolver even though he may not be in uniform and be
nominally off duty."':4 Therefore, when such a presumption is possi-
ble, the question of whether he was acting within the scope of his
employment is to be decided by the jury.
In a large city, where the police department must utilize a
limited amount of manpower to perform a multitude of functions
and where congested traffic and street construction is omnipresent,
it was held to be unreasonable to hold the city accountable for all
traffic accidents where an officer is not assigned to direct traffic
around or through the congestion and/or obstruction."3 5
The plaintiff's decedent had died as a result of an intersectional
collision caused by a visual obstruction resulting from the parking
of two vehicles in the middle of the street by the telephone com-
pany. During the first day of the obstruction, the city had assigned
a policeman to direct traffic at the intersection, but on the day of
the accident no officer was so assigned.
In rejecting the plaintiff's claim against the city, the District
of Court of Appeal, Third District, held that
[t]he dispatching of a traffic patrolman to this intersection was
a matter of judgment on the part of the city and the city has the
right to determine the strategy for deployment of its police pow-
ers, and sovereign authorities ought to be left free to exercise their
discretion without worry over allegations of negligence.23
A further limitation of liability was found in Moore v. City of
St. Petersburg,"7 in which the Second District held that to recover
for damages caused by faulty municipal construction, the plaintiff
must establish that the city was placed on actual notice of the
alleged defect or that the alleged defect existed for such a long
period of time that the city had constructive notice of it. The court
also went on to hold further that the construction of a sewage dis-
posal system was a governmental function "as opposed to a 'corpo-
rate or proprietary' function, such as street and sidewalk mainte-
nance .. ."I" Thus the city was protected by sovereign immunity
from liability for injuries caused to the plaintiff by a defect in such
234. Id.
235. Hernandez v. City of Miami, 305 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
236. Id. at 27; see Wong v. City of Miami, 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1970).
237. 281 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
238. Id. at 550.
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construction in the absence of direct confrontation between its em-
ployees and the plaintiff."'9
IX. THE NEW WRONGFUL DEATH ACT
The adoption of the new Florida Wrongful Death Act 4" raised
the serious question of whether the separate survival action24 was
also rendered inoperative in those instances where an action for
wrongful death could be brought under the new Act.'
Relying upon the provision in the new Act that [w]hen a per-
sonal injury to the decedent results in his death, no action for the
personal injury shall survive, and any action pending at the time
of death shall abate,2 43
the Supreme Court of Florida held that no separate statutory sur-
vival action for personal injuries resulting in death can survive the
decedent; such an action is, therefore, barred by the new Act.244 The
court also noted that the damages formerly recoverable under the
survival statute have been generally incorporated into the new Act
245
except that damages for the decedent's pain and suffering have been
replaced by damages for the survivor's pain and suffering.2 '4
Thus, under section 768.21 of the new Act, each specified survi-
vor may recover for (1) loss of past and future support and services,
(2) loss of companionship and protection, and (3) his or her own
mental pain and suffering from the date of the injury. The personal
representatives of the estate may recover further for medical and
funeral expenses and lost earnings, damages that would have been
formerly recoverable under the survivor statute.
The supreme court's ruling, however, does not bar actions
under the survival statute for causes of action which the decedent
239. See also City of Tampa v. Davis, 226 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969); Mathews
v. City of Tampa, 227 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
240. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.16-.27 (1973), hereinafter referred to as the new Act, repealing
FLA. STAT. § 768.01o.03 (1971) (hereinafter referred to as the old Act.)
241. The survival action is provided for by FLA. STAT. § 46.021 (1973):
No cause of action dies with the person. All causes of action survive and may be
commenced, prosecuted and defended in the name of the person prescribed by
law.
242. See W. Beckham & M. Esquiroz, Torts, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 662, 690-91 (1974).
243. FLA. STAT. § 768.20 (1973).
244. Martin v. United Security Servs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765 (1975).
245. See § 768.21(6) (1973).
246. See § 768.21(4) (1973).
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may have brought prior to his death unrelated to the injury causing
his death. 47 This means that personal injury actions arising from
occurrences other than the death-causing event shall survive, since
these actions are not incorporated under the Wrongful Death Act.
Damages for the pain and suffering of the decedent arising from
other such occurrences would also seem to be recoverable, since the
action would be brought under the survival statute rather than
under the Wrongful Death Act.
The adoption of the new Act was also held not to bar a claim
for punitive damages where the decedent's death was caused by the
willful and wanton conduct of the defendant and where one or more
of the elements of compensatory damages recoverable under the
Wrongful Death Act is established. The court did limit recovery of
punitive damages, however, by allowing only one such award for
each death so that each survivor is not entitled to an individual
claim for punitive damages. 4 ' The court reasoned that section
768.20, which provided for the abatement of actions for personal
injuries resulting in death, was not repugnant to the recovery of
punitive damages. Public policy required that a tortfeasor be pun-
ished for his reckless and malicious acts when he kills his victim as
well as when the victim is only injured.
In McKibben v. Mallory,4 ' the Supreme Court of Florida re-
jected the contention that a cause of action would not lie for a
wrongful death occurring prior to July 7, 1972, because the legisla-
ture had provided that the new Act would not apply to deaths
occurring before the effective date of the new Act and that the old
Act would be repealed when the new Act took effect.""0 The defen-
dants had argued that this resulted in the abolition and dissipation
of any cause of action for wrongful death when the death occurred
prior to July 7, 1972, unless the right had been reduced to judgment.
The court concluded, however, that the legislature did not in-
tend to abrogate causes of action for deaths occurring prior to July
7, 1972, but rather intended that the new Act would apply to deaths
occurring subsequent to the effective date and the old Act would
continue to apply to deaths occurring prior to that date, thus creat-
247. 314 So. 2d at 770 n.18.
248. Id. at 771-72; Pan American Bank of Sarasota v. Langan, 315 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1975).
249. 293 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1974).
250. FLA. STAT. § 768.27 (Supp. 1972).
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ing a cohesive and uninterrupted scheme for the handling of wrong-
ful death actions.
The terms "lineal descendent" and "person" were also defined
for purposes of the new Act during the survey period by district
court decisions rejecting unwarranted extensions of the scope of the
Act.
In Bassett v. Merlin, Inc.2 ' the Third District held that the
parents of a deceased adult are ascendants and therefore cannot be
considered "lineal descendants" within the meaning of section
768.21 (6)(a), which provides that if the decedent's survivors include
a surviving spouse or lineal descendants, loss of net accumulations
beyond death reduced to present value may be recovered for the
decedent's estate. The court pointed out that a descendant is one
who proceeds from the body of another, such as a child or grand-
child, while an ascendant is a person with whom one is related in
the ascending line, such as a parent or grandparent.
In Davis v. Simpson:252 the term "person," as used within the
new Act, was held not to include a full term, viable, but yet unborn
fetus. Without becoming entangled in an analysis of when life be-
gins, the court simply relied upon the retention of the word "per-
son" 253 in the new Act. It decided that since the legislature was
aware of the court's past construction of that term in the old Act to
include only a live born child,254 its failure to change the word "per-
son" demonstrated that there was no intent on the part of the legis-
lature to create a cause of action under the new Act for an unborn
fetus.
An innovative variation of the wrongful death action-the
wrongful birth-was attempted by three children and their parents
when a fourth child was born following the performance of a vasec-
tomy on the father.2 5
The court rejected this claim, however, by stating that the
''concept of a cause of action in children for a 'wrongful birth' is
without foundation in either law or logic.125 6
251. 304 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
252. 313 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
253. Compare FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1971) with § 768.19 (1973).
254. Staker v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968).
255. Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974). For a treatment of wrongful
birth actions in other states, see Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
256. 292 So. 2d at 419.
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